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CASE NOTES
tion in Ekco differed from that in Reynolds and Procter in that, McClintock
being a monopoly, Ekco entered a line of commerce in which there was no
competition to lessen. In view of this fact, the court felt it could not predict
anticompetitive effects on the basis of the acquisition alone and therefore
required post-acquisition evidence. The court pointed out that its holding ap-
plied only to the narrow factual situation of the Ekco case. In all probability,
however, Ekco should be read as consistent with Smith-Victor in requiring
post-acquisition evidence or some additional fact to invalidate a corporate
acquisition on the basis of the deep-pocket theory. The courts' requirement
seems to reflect a belief that the deep-pocket theory is a per se theory of
illegality30 and therefore unacceptable. In fact, however, the deep-pocket
theory simply raises a strong presumption of illegality—a presumption which
the defendant can rebut by coming forth with conclusive proof that the deep
pocket will not be used or that the theory does not apply to his case.
MICHAEL J. BALANOFF
Trade Regulation—Section 35 of Lanham Act—Accounting for Profits.
—Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prod. Mfg. Co. 1—Plaintiff Monsanto
manufactures and markets an acrylic fiber under its registered trademark
"Acrilan."2 Monsanto sold twenty thousand pounds of this fiber to defendant
Perfect Fit which used it in the manufacture of mattress pads. Defendant
sold them with labels bearing plaintiff's trademark and representing to cus-
tomers that the mattress pads were one hundred per cent Acrilan. Monsanto
purchased and analyzed several of these and determined that none contained
more than twenty-five per cent Acrilan and some contained no Acrilan at all.
Perfect Fit admitted the mislabeling and met with Monsanto in July and
August of 1958, but no settlement was reached. In November of 1958, Mon-
santo initiated a federal suit in the Southern District of New York for trade-
mark infringement and unfair competition.
The district court, sitting without a jury, found that Perfect Fit had in-
fringed Monsanto's trademark and that Perfect Fit had "deliberately at-
tempted to capitalize on the reputation which plaintiff had established for its
acrylic fiber."3 The court issued a permanent injunction and awarded legal
30 Ekco argued that the Commission had applied an absolute prohibition against
all acquisitions of small firms by large firms without regard to other factors. Supra note
2, at 751. The deep-pocket theory, however, is not a per se theory of illegality, although
it approaches one. It is not every acquisition of a small firm by a large firm that is
likely to have the substantial lessening of competition effects proscribed by § 7. In
some cases the acquisition may tend to increase competition. Some acquisitions may be
de minimis and have such a slight impact on competition, if any, that the law will
take no notice of them. The fact situation of each case will still be examined; the deep-
pocket theory, however, will make it more difficult to prove that the merger should not
be invalidated.
1
 349 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1965), petition for cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. Week 3192 (U.S.
Nov. 24, 1965) (No. 763).
2
 646 O.G. Pat. Off. 387 (1951); 674 0G. Pat. Off. 575 (1953).
a Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prod. Mfg. Co., 232 F. Supp. 493, 494-95
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
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fees, but held that Monsanto had failed to prove any damages. The court re-
fused to allow Monsanto an accounting for Perfect Fit's profits, as provided
for in Section 35 of the Lanham Act,4 on the ground that the parties were
not in direct competition, citing as authority the Second Circuit's decisions
in Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc.' and Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich. 8
Both par ties appealed.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court on the
issue of accounting, but otherwise affirmed the decision. HELD: Direct com-
petition is not required for an accounting of the infringer's profits and Ad-
miral Corp. v. Penco, Inc."' and Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich 8 are
overruled insofar as they are inconsistent with the present holding. The ap-
pellate court concluded that, given a willful infringement, the purposes and
language of the Lanham Act are best served by granting an accounting on
the theory of restitution of profits unjustly obtained at the trademark owner's
expense, and the requirement of direct competition does not adequately pro-
tect either the trademark owner's or the public's interest in being free from
this type of fraud.
The now equitable remedy of accounting, which devolved from the early
common law action of account-render," is properly based on restitution of
benefits unjustly obtained.'" At common law, the action was seldom used
successfully due to the effort required to surmount the technicalities of plead-
ings, and also because it was held to be available only on a certain fact
situation.fi Although the remedy at law was thus inadequate, it was soon
adopted by the chancery court. The wrongdoer is in a position similar to
that of a trustee ex maleficio and is compelled to transfer the benefits to the
person entitled to them. 12 -
The criteria by which an accounting is awarded in federal trademark
infringement cases are determined by the court's view of the nature of the
protectable interest the trademark owner has in his mark. Most federal courts
have held that a trademark is property in that the holder of the mark is en-
titled to exclusive possession and use as long as he continues to resort to it
for the identification of his product. 13
 Thus, when an infringer deliberately
appropriates the mark or symbol for his own benefit, these • "property" courts
will grant relief to the trademark owner, usually in the form of a permanent
injunction. In addition, many courts have awarded plaintiff an accounting of
4 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1964).
5
 203 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1953).
6 167 . F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948).
7 Supra note 5
8 Supra note 6.
2 Nims, Unfair Competition and Trademarks § 424 (4th ed. 1947) ; 4 Pomeroy,
Equity Jurisprudence § 1420 (5th ed. 1941).
10
 Blue Bell Co. v. Frontier Ref. Co., 213 F.2d 354, 363 (10th Cir. 1954); Restate-
ment, Restitution § 1, 136 (1937).
11' Pomeroy, supra note 9, at 1076 n.9.
12
 Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros., 240 U.S. 251, 259 (1916); Blue Bell
Co. v. Frontier Ref. Co., supra note 10.
13
 Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros., supra note 12; Trade Mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82, 92-93 (1879)
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the defendant's profits although the theory supporting such an award has
never been clearly enunciated. 14 To this extent, these courts were using ac-
counting in a restitution sense although no court expressly adopted the resti-
tution theory.
On the other hand, many courts, cited below, have held that a money
award should not be granted in a trademark infringement case unless the
plaintiff can show that his business has been injured by the defendant's con-
duct. As applied to accounting, this theory is incorrect and ignores the dis-
tinction between restitution, based on the right of the trademark holder to
be the only one entitled to the use of his mark, and damages, based on the
right of the trademark holder to be indemnified against loss caused by a tor-
tious infringement. Where this injury theory is used by the court, accounting
becomes merely another type of damages.
These "injury" courts can be divided into two groups. A small minority
of decisions hold that a trademark is not property and the trademark owner
has no exclusive right to the benefits of the use of his mark." This is derived
from the idea that there is nothing tangible in a trademark which can become
the subject of property and thus be "owned" by any one person. Therefore,
the trademark owner will be compensated only for his injuries. Other injury
courts, although not expressly rejecting the property theory of trademarks,
have nevertheless refused to award an accounting in cases where the plaintiff
does not show injury, on the ground that it is inequitable to allow him a
money recovery unless he has been injured by the infringement." Both of
these types of decisions lead to the same result: the trademark owner is not
entitled to an accounting unless he can prove injury.
There are many valid reasons for refusing to grant an accounting in a
particular case," but to base the denial solely on the inability of the trade-
mark owner to prove injury is a confusion of restitution and damages. Further,
the equability of. permitting a commercial parasite to retain his unjustly
earned profits is doubtful. The practical aspects of such a requirement are
examined below.
The kinds of injury recognized in infringement suits include injury to
reputation or to good will and loss of profits from direct sales. In order to
recover damages for these injuries, the trademark owner must show (I) that
he has suffered a loss, (2) the extent to which he has been injured, and (3)
that the injury was caused by the defendant's infringement.
It has been all but impossible for the trademark owner to successfully
carry the above burdens of proof in relation to injury to reputation or to
14 E.g., Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Bros., 240 U.S. 251 (1916); Maternally
Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956); Century Distilling
Co. v. Continental Distilling Corp., 205 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1953).
15 Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924); Durable Toy & Novelty
Corp. v. J. Chein & Co., 133 F.2d 853, 854 (2d Cir. 1943).
1.6
 McCormack & Co. v. Manischewitz Co., 206 F.2d 744, 747 (6th Cir. 1953);
Veatch v. Wagner, 116 F. Supp. 904, 906 (D.C. Alaska 1953); Stardust, Inc. v. Weiss,
79 F. Supp. 274, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
17
 Nims, supra note 9, 428A provides a list of reasons why an accounting should
not be granted. For example: Where the defendant has acted in good faith; where
both parties are at fault; where there has been lathes or. acquiescence.
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good will because of the intangibility of such assets. 18 Indeed, it is usually
impossible for the plaintiff to prove a direct sales loss or a loss analogous to
direct sales loss unless the parties are competing. Since, in an injury court,
proof of injury is a prerequisite for accounting as well as for damages, it is
very unlikely that the plaintiff will receive any money recovery at all. More-
over, there are no criminal sanctions in federal trademark law. Thus, the
public policy which demands that this type of fraudulent conduct be dis-
couraged cannot be effected in an injury court.
It is submitted that in an attempt to avoid these undesirable results, the
injury courts "relaxed" the plaintiff's burden of proof to the extent that,
in a situation where the parties were competing, the courts inferred that the
deliberate infringement must have caused plaintiff a loss of profits due to
diversion of sales. 1° Since the injury courts thus eliminated the difficult tasks
of proving loss and causation insofar as this type of damages (direct sales
loss) was concerned, the largely unsuccessful attempts to prove other types
of damages were abandoned, and the whole problem of proof of damages
devolved into the lesser problem of proving competition. Few could prove
damages without the aid of the relaxation; thus the relaxation became the
"rule" of direct competition. 2° In an injury court, accounting depended upon
proof of injury, so the direct competition rule was applied to accounting.
This rule is not only inadequate as a panacea for attempted proof of
damages,21 but under the proper restitution approach would be entirely ir-
relevant to the issue of accounting. Moreover, under the direct competition
rule, plaintiff must still prove the extent of his loss to receive an accounting
in an injury court. 22 This problem would not arise in a restitution setting
since extent of injury would have no bearing on the issue of accounting.
Since injury courts require direct competition and property courts do
not,23 it is clear that there is no uniform treatment of accounting in federal
18 Some states have alleviated the problem in this area by the passage of anti-
dilution statutes. E.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 110, § 7A (1958):
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive
quality of a trade name or trade-mark shall be a ground for injunctive relief
in cases of trade-mark infringement or unfair competition, notwithstanding the
absence of competition between the parties. . • .
Although this statute does not provide for a money recovery, it does predicate the
allowance of an injunction merely on the showing of "likelihood of injury" and does
not require proof of injury. Similar statutes may be found in Ga. Code Ann. § 106-15
(1956); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 140, § 22 (1964); and N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368D (Supp.
1965).
1° See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 206
(1942).
20 Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc., supra note 5, at 521; National Dryer Mfg. Corp.
v. National Drying Mach. Co., 136 F. Supp. 886, 887 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
21 For a discussion of direct sales damages that do not depend on competition, see
note 39 infra and accompanying text.
22 See, e.g., Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509, 512 (6th Cir. 1924);
Acme Chem. Co. v. Dobkin, 68 F. Supp. 601, 615 (W.D. Pa. 1946).
23 Baker v. Simmons Co., 325 F.2d 580, 582 (1st Cir. 1963); Blue Bell Co. v.
Frontier Ref. Co., supra note 10.
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trademark case law. In fact, both the property and the injury theories have
been employed in the same circuit. 24 The result is confusion.
This confusion has been augmented by careless usage of the word
"profits." In the proper context of accounting, "profits" refers only to the
profits realized by the infringer and not to the profits which the trademark
owner may have lost through diverted sales. The trademark owner's "lost
profits" is only one form that his damages may take and has nothing to do
with accounting.
This distinction was recognized by the Trademark Act of 1905 25 and
the Lanham Act of 1946,2$ both of which allow the plaintiff to recover de-
fendant's profits, his own damages, and the costs of the action. Section 35 of
the Lanham Act provides:
When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered
in the Patent Office shall have been established in any civil action
arising under this Act, the plaintiff shall be entitled, . . . subject to
the principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any
damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action
. In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove de-
fendant's sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or
deduction claimed.27
Thus, under this act, neither direct competition nor proof of injury is rele-
vant to the issue of accounting. In fact, in a proper case, there is no reason
why the trademark owner cannot recover both the defendant's profits (through
an accounting) and his own damages.28
Despite the above language in section 35, injury courts have continued
to require proof of injury and direct competition for accountings. The policy
that it is inequitable to award an accounting absent proof of injury is so in-
grained in these courts that they have interpreted the phrase "subject to the
principles of equity" in section 35 to be a reaffirmation of this policy. Thus,
in an injury court, plaintiff has no broader base of relief under the Lanham
Act than he had previous to its enactment.29
Judge Giles Rich of the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals commented generally on the federal judiciary and the Lanham Act:
In such a changing field texts get out of date, cases get out of date.
The statute got out of date and 8 years were spent producing the
Lanham Act, which is filled with strange and wonderful things!
24 In the Third Circuit, compare Admiral Corp. v. Price Vacuum Stores, Inc., 141
F. Supp. 796 (E.D. Pa. 1956), with National Dryer Mfg. Corp. v. National Drying
Mach. Co., 136 F. Supp. 886 (ED. Pa. 1955). For Second Circuit cases, see text
accompanying notes 31-35 infra.
25 33 Stat. 724, 729.
28 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. 11117 (1964).
27 Ibid.
28
 Pastificio Spiga Societa v. De Martini Macaroni Co., 200 F.2d 325, 327 (2d Cir.
1952); Aladdin Mfg. Co. v. Mantle Lamp Co., 116 F.2d 708, 715-16 (7th Cir. 1941).
29
 Admiral Corp. v. Penco, Inc., supra note 5, at 521; Triangle Publications, Inc.
v. Rohrlich, supra note 6, at 974,
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Very few members of the Federal judiciary have had much initia-
tion into its mysteries. 3°
The situation in the Second Circuit is illustrative of the confusion
prevalent in the federal circuits. In Durable Toy & Novelty Corp. v. I. Chein
& Co.," the appellate court specifically rejected the idea that a trademark is
property. And in Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich 32 and Admiral Corp.
v. Penco, Inc.,33
 the same court refused to award an accounting because the
parties were not competing. On the other hand, there are indications of
proper use of accounting. In Maternally Yours v. Your Maternity Shop,84
the court held that the infringer must account for his profits, even in areas
where he did not compete with the trademark owner. Finally, in Dad's Root
Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages, Inc.," the court not only ordered an accounting
although there was no competition, but also used strong restitution language
in referring to the infringer as a trustee of the profits for the trademark
owner.36
 The Monsanto decision, expressly adopting the restitution theory
for the first time and discarding the direct competition rule as applied to ac-
counting, has settled the problem, at least for the Second Circuit.
Unfortunately, the impact of the Monsanto decision is impaired by con-
fusing language in the opinion. Although the majority affirmed the lower
court's finding of no damages, the treatment of the accounting issue is ob-
scured by frequent reference to Monsanto's "damages." 87 In addition, the
court states that "compensation for diverted trade is one important purpose
which an accounting may serve."38
 This is entirely inconsistent with the resti-
tution theory of accounting. Accounting has been used as compensation for
diverted trade, but this is a misuse. Recovery for diverted trade is within the
realm of damages, not accounting.
Judge Moore, concurring and dissenting, agreed that the case should
be reversed and remanded for an accounting, but suggested that the
trial court should also re-examine the finding of no damages in light of
the appellate court's elimination of the direct competition requirement.
Judge Moore's point is this: perhaps the trial judge, over-impressed with
the emphasis on direct competition, simply did not consider other types
of injury which do not depend on a showing of competition. As an
example, he argues •that Monsanto has suffered a loss analogous to direct
sales loss in that it has lost the profits it would have made had Perfect Fit's
mattress pads been composed of one hundred per cent Acrilan as advertised,
and that Perfect Fit should be required to compensate Monsanto for this
loss." Judge Moore's suggestion will assume great importance if the restitu-
80
 Rich, Trademark Problems As I See Them—Judiciary, 52 Trademark Rep. 1183,
1186 (Nov. 1962).
31 Supra note 15.
32 Supra note 6
33 Supra note S
84 Supra note 14.
ss 193 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1951).
80
 Id. at 82
37
 Supra note 1, at 395-96.
88 Id. at 397.
39
 Id. at 397. Since Monsanto did attempt to prove damages that do not depend
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tion theory is adopted by the other circuits. Since the plaintiff will in all
likelihood receive adequate compensation by way of an accounting, the direct
competition rule can be placed in its proper perspective. That is, direct com-
petition is relevant only to the consideration of one type of damages (direct
sales loss), and even here competition should not be the exclusive considera-
tion because it is possible to show a loss analogous to direct sales loss that
does not depend on competition.
Despite the unfortunate language, the majority decision in Monsanto is
significant for the following reasons:
(1) The decision specifically adopted the restitution approach to ac-
counting as the law of the Second Circuit. It may induce other circuits, as yet
unclear on accounting, to follow the Second Circuit's analysis, thus resulting
in a uniform statement of accounting in federal trademark cases.
(2) Since, under the restitution theory, the trademark owner need
prove only unauthorized use by the infringer, a greater number of accountings
will be awarded, and the owner's interest in the exclusive use of his mark will
be more adequately protected. The 'owner will receive a money compensation
and such blatant commercial piracy as was practiced in the Monsanto case is
likely to be deterred.
(3) The opinion refers to the language of the Lanham Act and gives
it a fair interpretation—one that is long overdue in the federal courts. The
broad provisions of section 35 provide all the authority needed to eliminate
the direct competition as it is applied to accounting."
(4) The court stated that public policy demands that this type of
fraudulent conduct be prevented. The individual consumer invests only a
small amount of money in a mattress pad and is unlikely to seek a remedy
in court when he discovers that the product is not what it seemed to be.
Since there are no criminal sanctions in federal trademark law and since
damages are so difficult to prove, the liberal use of accounting is the only
available deterrent. In Monsanto, it appears that this consideration of public
policy was a very important factor in the decision, although the primary
purpose of the restitution theory is to restore the profits gained from the
infringement to their rightful owner, and not to protect the public from fraud.
DAVID L. CLANCY
on competition (Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 18-19), it seems probable that the Judge did
consider this type of damages.
40 S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946), reported in U.S. Code Cong.
Service 1274:
The purpose of this bill is to place all matters relating to trade-marks in one
statute and to eliminate judicial obscurity, to simplify registration and to make
it stronger and more liberal, to dispense with mere technical prohibitions and
arbitrary provisions, to make procedure simple, and relief against infringement
prompt and effective.
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